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Old Remedies in the Biotechnology Age:
Moore v. Regents*
Michelle J. Burke and Victoria M. Schmidt**
Introduction
The past two decades have brought great advances in medicine and
science, primarily through developments in genetic engineering.
Although this bloom of biotechnology has resulted in many medical
breakthroughs, it has also raised many unanswered questions. So far,
the legal system has dealt with relatively few of them. More and more
frequently, however, courts are being called upon to use age-old legal
principles to solve new-age problems. This is well illustrated by Moore
v. Regents of the University of California (hereafter Moore).1
As many know from widespread reports of this case, John Moore
brought suit alleging that his physician, David W. Golde, and others
with whom Golde had a financial relationship were accountable to him
for income derived from economic exploitation of cells removed from
his body. Golde and others named as defendants took the position that,
even if everything alleged on behalf of Moore were true, he would be
endiled to no relief.
* The authors appreciate the research guidance, as well as editorial and other
assistance, furnished by James T. Sullivan who has since received his J.D. from
Franklin Pierce Law Center [FPLC]. They also appreciate the assistance of Dr. Jon
F. Merz, who was kind enough to read and comment on an earlier draft.
** Ms. Burke holds a B.S. in Biotechnology (with Distinction) from Worcester
Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts. She is a J.D. and'Masters of Intellectual
Property candidate at FPLC.
Ms. Schmidt holds a B.A. in Chemistry from Indiana University of
Pennsylvania and has biotechnology research experience. She is a J. D. candidate at
FPLC concentrating in intellectual property law.
1 Moore v. Regents, U. California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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Having decided that Moore failed to allege critical facts, the trial
court dismissed his complaint.2 Following reversal by an intermediate
appellate court,3 the ultimate task faced by the Supreme Court of
California was to determine whether, assuming that his allegations were
true, Moore would be entitled to any relief. The majority of that court
found Moore's allegations adequate to permit him to go forth with his
suit and remanded the case for further proceedings.4
Although Moore's circumstances are fairly unique, his suit has been
seen as raising broad policy issues that have been considered in
Congressional hearings5 and addressed at length in the literature.6
As a result, John Moore has been lost in a forest of policy. The decision
of the California Supreme Court, by excluding one of his potential
remedies, has eliminated many of the larger concerns generated by the
case. Unfortunately, it gave little attention to the remedies that remain.
In our view a remedy of considerable vintage can be applied to achieve a
just result in these particular circumstances without having much of an
impact on the biotechnology world at large.
To set the stage for discussion of what we believe to be the most
appropriate remedy, a constructive trust, it is necessary first to consider
Moore's allegations and the analyses of Moore's legal theories as
addressed in the majority, concurring and dissenting opinions.
Facts and Procedural History
The "facts" recited herein are not ones determined by a trial, indeed,
because discovery7 follows only after a complaint is found adequate,
2 Id. at486.
3 Moore v. Regents, U. California, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.
1988) - note that the intermediate decision can be distinguished from the Supreme
Court by the reporter in which it appears.
4 793 P.2d. at 497.
5 The Use of Human Biological Materials in the Development of Biomedical
Products: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
[hereinafter Hearings].
6 Discussed infra notes 96-99.
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they are in many respects incomplete. 8 In such a situation, courts
presume for purposes of legal discussion that alleged facts are true.
Thus, the courts consider allegations only for purposes of determining
whether, if true, they would entitle a plaintiff to some kind of legal
relief. If they are found adequate, the plaintiff then is afforded an
opportunity to prove their truth at trial.
As alleged in his complaint, in 1976, John Moore, a resident of
Seattle, Washington, was diagnosed, at the University of California at
Los Angeles Medical Center ('UCLA" or "Medical Center"), as having
a rare form of cancer known as hairy-cell leukemia. 9 Along with the
destruction of normal blood cells and infiltration of the bone marrow,
another common characteristic of this form of cancer is the enlargement
of the spleen. 10 Consequently, in order to "slow down the progress of
his disease",1 1 David W. Golde, the attending physician,
recommended the removal of Moore's spleen.
At that time, Golde and Shirley Quan, a UCLA research
employee: 12
were aware that "certain blood products and blood
components were of great value in a number of commercial
and scientific efforts" and that access to a patient whose
blood contained these substances would provide
"competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages."
Indeed, it is alleged that, prior to the splenectomy operation, Golde
and Quan had already made arrangements to take part of Moore's spleen
to a separate research unit. 13 However, Moore claims never to have
7 Discovery consists of pre-trial mechanisms for one party to learn facts important
to preparation of the case from the other party. See, e.g., Fed. Rules Civ. Pro. 26-
37. See also, BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 466 (6th ed. 1990).
8 793 P.2d at 500 (Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
9 Id. at481.
10 INTERNAoNAL DICIONARY OF MEDICNE AND BIOLOGY 2476 (1986).
11 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. [To minimize the number of notes, repeated citations
to the same location in a document are ordinarily omitted. Thus, all factual
allegations between two footnotes are documented in the former.]
12 Id.
3 RISK -Issues in Health & Safety 219 [Summer 1992]
been informed of the value of his cells prior to consenting to the
operation in October, 1976.
Moore returned several times between then and September, 1983,
because Golde told him this was "necessary and required for his health
and well being." At a subsequent Congressional hearing, Moore said
that he dreaded these visits, because they suggested that he still was not
cured. 14 During each visit, Golde withdrew additional samples of
"blood, blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm." 15
In 1983, Moore said that he could no longer afford to travel to
UCLA and asked if it would be possible to undergo treatments at a
closer medical facility. 16 Golde then agreed to fund his travel
expenses.
Although, he had not previously been asked to give expressed
consent to blood or tissue withdrawals during any of the preceding ten
or so visits to Golde's facilities, 17 in April, 1983, Moore was asked to
sign a form authorizing the use of withdrawn blood for research. This
was presented as a mere formality. Moore claimed that although the
explanation was vague, he trusted his physician and signed the form as
instructed. On the space provided on the form, Moore marked: 18
I do voluntarily grant to the University of California any and
all rights I, or my heirs, may have in any cell line or any
other potential product which might be developed from the
blood and/or bone marrow obtained from me.
During a September visit, Moore informed Golde that his parents
were moving from Los Angeles, and that he would no longer have a
place to stay. 19 Golde then agreed to pay for lodging at a posh Beverly
13 Id. Golde gave written instructions to this effect on October 18 and 19, 1976,
prior to Moore's October 20 splenectomy.
14 Hearings, supra note 5 at 242 (testimony of John Moore).
15 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
16 Hearings, supra note 5, at 242 (testimony of John Moore).
17 Id. at 251-2 (statement of John Moore).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 253. Moore had been staying at his parent's home in Los Angeles
whenever he came to UCLA for "follow up" treatments.
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Hills hotel. When Moore was again asked to sign a consent form, he
directly asked Golde about the commercial potential of his cells. Golde
indicated there wasn't any, but his demeanor and vagueness in
responding made Moore suspicious. This time when Moore signed the
consent form, he circled "I do not voluntarily grant..."
Within hours of that visit, Moore received a phone call from Golde
informing him that he had completed the form incorrectly and requesting
him to return to the Medical Center to sign another consent form. Moore
said he could not. Golde's secretary then mailed the form to Moore in
Seattle, with instructions on how to complete the form.20 Moore did
not return the form. Three months later, Golde wrote, urging Moore to
sign the form and circle that he granted the University of California the
rights to his cell lines. Moore did not.
Moore's uneasiness with his physician's insistence regarding the
signing of the consent form, evasiveness when questioned about the
commercial development of the cells, and overeager willingness to pay
for his travel and lodging expenses prompted Moore to contact a
lawyer.2 1 Through their investigations, Moore's attorneys learned that
Golde had developed a cell line from Moore's T-lymphocyte cells22 by
1979 and had applied for a patent in 1981.23 The patent, covering the
cell line and various methods for using it to produce lymphokines, 24
issued in. 1983. It named Golde and Quan as the inventors and the
20 Id. at 255.
21 id.
22 T-lymphocytes are white blood cells that destroy, e.g., virus infected cells. In
contrast, B-lymphocytes combat bacteria and viruses in extra-cellular media. See,
e.g., LUBERT STRYER, BIOcHMISTY 911 (1988). See also, Moore, 793 P.2d at 481
n.2.
23 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-2.
24 Lymphokines are peptides and proteins secreted by T-lymphocytes. These
hormone-like molecules direct the activities or other cells. See, e.g., STRYER,
supra note 22, at 912.
Interferons, a species of lymphokine, bind to the membrane of other cells and
induce an antiviral state leading to resistance to a broad spectrum of viruses; id., at
880-1.
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Regents as assignee [owner]. 25 Also, Moore's attorneys learned that
Golde, with the Regents' assistance, had negotiated agreements for
commercial development of the cell line and derivative products. Under
an agreement with Genetics Institute, Golde "became a paid consultant"
and "acquired the rights to 75,000 shares of common stock." Genetics
Institute also agreed to pay Golde and the Regents "at least $330,000
over three years, including a pro-rata share of [Golde's] salary and,
fringe benefits, in exchange for... exclusive access to the materials and
research performed" on the cell line and its derivatives. In 1982, Sandoz
joined the agreement, and compensation payable to Golde and the
Regents was increased by $110,000.26
Believing these facts to be true, Moore filed a lawsuit in superior
court, naming Golde, Quan, the Regents, Genetics Institute, and
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals as defendants. 27 His complaint stated thirteen
causes of action,2 8 including conversion, lack of informed consent,
breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 29 Based on those theories and allegations, Moore claimed that
damages for personal injury and, e.g, an interest in all products derived
from those cells. 30
Defendants filed demurrers31 to all of Moore's causes of action.32
Finding Moore's allegations inadequate in several respects, the Superior
Court dismissed the complaint as to all defendants. 33
25 Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
26 According to industry reports, the market value of lymphokines was predicted to
be $3.01 billion dollars by the year 1990; id.
27 id.
28 A cause of action is a situation or set of facts that entitle a person to seek a
judicial remedy. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAWDIcriONARY 221 (6th ed. 1990).
29 Moore, 793 P.2d at 482, n.4.
30 See, e.g., id. at 487.
31 A demurrer challenges whether the facts presented by the plaintiff, even if true,
are legally sufficient to establish the causes of action claimed in the complaint. See,
e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 433 (6th ed. 1990).
32 Moore, 793 P.2d. at 482, n.5.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.34 Finding no authority
to the contrary, it held that Moore retained a property interest in his
excised cells. 35 It also held that Moore had never consented to the way
Golde used his cells. 36 However, the court agreed that the complaint as
to Genetics Institute and Sandoz Pharmaceuticals was inadequate. 37
Upon further appeal, a majority of the California Supreme Court
concluded that Moore did not have a cause of action for conversion but
did have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed
consent.38 In an opinion written by Justice Panellii, it reversed the
intermediate court of appeal in that respect but agreed that Moore should
have the opportunity to amend his complaint with regard to Genetics
Institute and Sandoz.39
Subsequently, Moore sought certiori with the U.S. Supreme Court,
but that court declined to accept the appeal0 0 Currently, the case awaits
trial or possible agreement of the parties to settle.
Analysis of the Majority View of
Informed Consent and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The majority opinion, having recited many of Moore's factual
allegations and the procedural history of the case, did not immediately
turn to Moore's conversion cause of action - in spite of the fact that the
two lower courts had focused exclusively on it. Rather, it began by
calling attention to Moore's allegations that Golde failed to disclose the
extent of his research and economic interests in Moore's cells - and
observing that 'These allegations, in our view, state a cause of action
33 See, e.g., id. at 486; see also, infra, discussion at notes 96-8.
34 Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. 494.
35 Id at 503.
36 Id.*at 510.
37 Moore, 793 P. 2d. at 483.
38 Id. at480.
39 Id. at 487.
40 Moore v. Regents, U. California, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
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against Golde for invading a legally protected interest of his patient.' 4 1
The majority further noted that:42
Our analysis begins with three well-established principles.
First "a person of adult years and in sound mind has the
right... to submit to lawful medical treatment." ... Second,
"the patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be
an informed consent." ... Third, in soliciting the patient's
consent, a physician has a duty to disclose all information
material to the patient's decision.
Before pursuing an analysis of this portion of the opinion, however,
it will be useful, briefly and separately, to consider informed consent
and breach of fiduciary duty as they are more commonly applied.
Informed Consent Generally
A physician failing to obtain valid informed consent before
performing a medical procedure may be liable under two possible
theories, battery and negligence.4 3 The former is for the redress of
willful, the latter for inadvertent, injuries. Early decisions involving
informed consent were predicated on the idea that contact by a physician
in the absence of informed authorization could constitute a battery.
However, courts, except in Pennsylvania and Tennessee, have now
limited recovery for lack of informed consent to negligence. 4
Informed consent does not require physicians to disclose every
possibility of risk of which they are aware. Situations requiring
immediate medical action or ones where the disclosure may
unnecessarily alarm or cause adverse psychological effects to the patient
receive special treatment. 45 Also, for example, there is no duty to
disclose what is commonly known or information that would not
influence the decision of the patient.46
41 Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
42 Jj
43 See generally, RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT (1986); Marcus L. Plante, An Analysis of "fnformed Consent," 36
FORDHAM L. REv. 639,648-50 (1968).
44 Jon F. Merz, An Empirical Analysis of the Medical Informed Consent
Doctrine: The Search For a "Standard" of Disclosure, 2 RISK 27, 33 (1991).
45 Id. at 37.
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To recover for lack of informed consent, it is unnecessary to find
improper treatment.4 7 Compensation may be awarded even if the
physician's actions fall within the usual "standard of care; ' 48 the focus
is whether the risk of the outcome was disclosed.4 9
Standards for disclosure vary. California, for example, uses the
"prudent patient" standard for disclosure. Under that standard, patients
need only convince a trial court that a reasonable patient would not
have consented to the treatment had he or she known of the possible
outcome.50 Other jurisdictions focus on the physician rather than the
patient and permit recovery only if undisclosed risks were ones other
similarly situated physicians would have disclosed under the
circumstances. 5 1 In the latter jurisdictions, expert testimony is required
to determine whether the physician's behavior was appropriate. 52 In
any case, patients must establish that, had they known of the risk, they
would not have consented.53
Breach of Fiduciary Duty Generally
According to California law:54
Confidential and fiduciary relations are, in law,
synonymous, and may be said to exist whenever trust and
confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and
fidelity of another. The very existence of such a relation
precludes the party in whom trust and confidence is reposed
46 Id. at 36-7.
47 Id. at 33-4.
48 The procedure may have been a technical success, but as a consequence the
patient is left to deal with undisclosed, collateral side effects, for example hearing
loss or scarring, which may be typical of even the most successful surgery.
49 Merz, supra note 44, at 33.
50 Id. at 35-6. See also, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (1972).
51 Id. at 35-6.
52 Plante, supra note 43, at 660-.
53 In short, the omission must have caused the injury in fact. Cause-in-fact is
established with a "but for" test, i.e., but for event A, event B would not have
occured.
54 Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
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from participating in profit or advantage resulting from the
dealings of the parties to the relation.
Whether a relationship can be characterized as "fiduciary" depends
on the behavior of the parties, not on a formal label applied to the
relationship. 55 Fiduciaries are usually forbidden from participating in
transactions involving beneficiaries when they have a personal interest
in the transaction. 56 However, a beneficiary may agree to such a
transaction if there is a complete disclosure of the fiduciary's interest
and consent is free from any influence on the part of the fiduciary.57
Thus, unlike complaints seeking compensation for personal injuries
following failure to obtain informed consent, complaints based on a
breach of fiduciary duty ordinarily seek to transfer an economic gain
from a fiduciary to a party to whom duties are owed.
The Majority's Discussion of Informed Consent
and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The Superior Court had dismissed his complaint partly because
Moore failed to allege that:58
[D]efendants knew his cells had potential commercial value
on October 5, 1975 (the time blood tests were first
performed...) and at that time already formed the intent to
exploit the cells. (Emphasis in original.)
However, a majority of the Supreme Court found it adequate for
Moore to allege an undisclosed research interest at the time consent was
sought for the splenectomy which was performed on October 20.59
Also, in disagreement with the Superior Court, that court found it
unnecessary for Moore to allege that the splenectomy lacked a
therapeutic purpose. In the same context, it further noted Moore's
allegations that (1) Golde had established economic interests in his cells
prior to withdrawals of "Bodily Substances," (2) such withdrawals had
no therapeutic purpose, and (3) Golde's economic interests were
55 Id.at237-9.
56 CAL PROB. CODE § 16004(a) (West 1985); see also, e.g., id. § 15002.
57 CAL PROB. CODE § 16463 (West 1985).
58 Moore, 763 P.2d. at 486 [italics in original].
59 Id. at 485-6.
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actively concealed.
Indeed, Moore alleged that, in a memo addressed to staff members,
Golde formed the intent and prepared to culture Moore's cells before the
splenectomy was performed.6 0 There was even a space on Moore's
consent form reserved for this type of disclosure, but it was left
blank.6 1 Moore alleges that not only did he ask repeatedly about the
economic potential for his cells, but also that Golde denied the
possibility and discouraged Moore from asking further questions.6 2
Moore claims that he was unaware of Golde's undertakings until an
investigation was initiated on his behalf seven years later.63
The majority in Moore finds such conduct actionable. Their
opinion establishes that a physician has a duty to disclose all facts
material to a patient's decision - regardless of whether they relate to
potential adverse outcomes of a procedure or matters that could
influence the physician's professional judgment.64 It is the latter notion
that expands the doctrine of informed consent as usually applied and
brings in the idea of fiduciary duties.
A physician is certainly a fiduciary as defined above.6 5 While the
majority did not address what this might mean in terms of Moore's
recovery, 66 we will explore that further after considering the other
issue addressed by the majority.
Analysis of the Majority View of Conversion
Conversion Generally
Conversion occurs when one holds another's personal property
without permission.67 It began as a "gap filler" in the common law.6 8
60 Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
61 Hearings, supra note 5, at 267 (statement of John Moore).
62 Moore, 793 P.2d at 485-6.
63 Hearings, supra note 5, at 243 (testimony of John Moore).
64 Moore, 763 P.2d. at 485.
65 Supra at note 54.
66 But see Moore, 763 P.2d. at 485, n.10.
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Early cases usually involved a finder of goods who, instead of returning
them, kept or otherwise disposed of them.69 Such cases could not be
brought under trespass or detinue because both of those require
wrongful taking, not wrongful withholding.70 Conversion was later
expanded to deal with both wrongful taking and wrongful
withholding, 7 1 almost completely replacing trespass to personal
property and detinue.72 Plaintiffs prevail if they can prove that they
have a right to possess property and that a defendant's interference
causes loss.7 3 Not only can plaintiffs prevail as to, e.g., finders but
also as to "one who, though honestly and in good faith, purchases
personal property from one having no title thereto or right to sell the
same...." 74 Significantly, this is true even if the statute of limitations
has run (expired) as to the original wrongdoer, it begins to run anew
each time the property is sold.75
The Majority's Discussion of Conversion
Traditionally, courts examine prior cases and statutes for authority
governing the precise legal questions involved. Failing that, they attempt
to find cases or statutes that are closely analogous. In addressing
possible recovery under breach of fiduciary duty and informed consent,
Justice Panelli found these adequate to his needs.
However, when neither approach easily resolves an issue, a court
faces a difficult choice. Should it extend authority to cover the situation
67 See, e.g, BLACK'S LAWDICIIONARY 332 (6th ed. 1990).
68 "Common law," as distinguished from statutory law created by legislatures,
comprises principles and causes of action which derive their authority solely from
earlier decisions of courts. See, e.g., BLACK's LAWDircIoNARY 276 (6th ed. 1990).
69 William L. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L. REv. 168, 169
(1957).
70 Id. at 169.
71 Prosser, supra note 69, at 170.
72 id.
73 89 CJ.S. Trover and Conversion §§ 3, 4, 5, 33 (1955).
74 Culp v. Signal Van & Storage, 298 P.2d. 162, 164 (Cal. 1956).
75 ia
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or should it leave the matter for the legislature? In either case, the
legislature (constitutional issues aside) is in control, i.e., if the court
extends the law and the legislature disagrees in any respect, it can enact
legislation producing the outcome it believes proper.
Within this framework, the Moore majority found no previous
decision defining the extent of property rights in excised cells.76 Next,
it reviewed decisions recognizing rights in privacy and publicity.7 7
Moore's lawyers argued that if rights exist in one's likeness, they
should be found in one's cells and genetic material - "something far
mor profoundly the essence of one's human uniqueness than a name or
a face."7 8 The court, however, was uncomfortable with analogizing to
rights based on unauthorized exploitation of an individual's unique
persona because basic genetic material is not unique to Moore.7 9
Moore's attorneys also attempted to establish rights based on a
California decision upholding the right to refuse medical treatment.80
There, in permitting a patient to have a feeding tube removed, the court
had stated that every person of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his or her body. Yet, the majority in
Moore did not find this helpful.81
It also considered Venner, a Maryland case82 that had influenced
the Court of Appeals. 8 3 In that case, several balloons containing
hashish oil had been recovered from Venner's hospital bedpan84 for
use as evidence. In that context, the Venner court had observed:85
76 Moore, 793 P.2d. at 487.
77 Id. at489.
78 Id. at490.
79 Id. at 490.
80 Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986).
81 Moore, 793 P.2d at 491.
82 Venner v. State, 354 A.2d. 483 (Md. 1976).
83 Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
84 Venner, 354 A.2d. at 485.
85 Id. at 498.
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It is not unknown for a person to assert a continuing
right of ownership, dominion, or control, for good reason or
for no reason, over such things as excrement, fluid waste,
secretions, hair, fingernails, toenails, blood, and organs or
other parts of the body....
Notwithstanding that the language seems apt, Venner was also
found irrelevant. 86 Having considered such cases, Justice Panelli
concluded not only that Moore was attempting to "force the round pegs
of 'privacy' and 'dignity' into the square hole of 'property,"' but also
that such interests could best be protected by "fiduciary-duty and
informed-consent theories." 87
Having found no cases useful for guidance, the majority looked to
California statutes. The closest was one requiring:88
"recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical
human remains, or infectious wastes" to be buried,
incinerated, or disposed of by any other method determined
by the state department of health services after the end of
scientific use.
Although the Legislature was obviously not addressing the question
of a patient's right to compensation for excised cells, the majority
interpreted this statute to limit the control that patients might otherwise
have over cells removed from their body.89
It found the statute to destroy too many of the rights associated with
property for the remainder to be adequate to support a conversion
claim.90 Yet, the court states that there is:9 1
no need to read the statute to permit a "scientific use" which
is contrary to the patient's expressed wish. A fully informed
patient may always withhold consent to treatment by a
physician whose research plans the patient does not approve.
86 Moore, 793 P.2d. at 489,490, n.28.
87 la
88 CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 1985), quoted in Moore, 793
P.2d. at 491.
89 Moore, 793 P.2d. at491.
90 Id. at 492.
91 ld
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It then discussed the implications of a patent's having been issued
on a cell line derived from Moore's cells.92 Because federal patent law
will not give rights in naturally occurring substances, the court found
that the patented cell line must be sufficiently different from his spleen
cells to negate a finding that Moore would have a property right in that
line.9 3
Having decided that neither case nor statutory law afforded Moore
an action for conversion, the court turned to the question of whether it
should extend the law. It began by stating three reasons why that should
not be done:94
First, a fair balancing of the relevant policy considerations
counsels against extending the tort. Second, problems in this
area are bettdr suited to legislative resolution. Third, the tort
of conversion is not necessary to protect patients' rights.
In short, and in spite of strong arguments of dissenters, 95 it closed
the Pandora's box - as reflected in the literature already generated 96
- previously opened by the Court of Appeals. For example, some
commentators were concerned that undue focus on property interests
might lead to the poor selling parts of themselves or being unable to
afford treatment9 7 - or the possibility of people being killed for their
92 id.
93 Id. at 493.
94 Id
95 See, e.g., responses of the majority, 792 P.2d at 495 n.40 and at 491 n.41.
See also, the special concurrence of Justice Arabian on the point, at 497.
96 Only a fraction of it is relevant here. See generally, U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-337, NEW DEVELOPMENTS iN BioECNOLOGY:
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CEjS - SPECIAL REPORT 55 (1989).
For discussions concerning the ownership of excised tissue, see, e.g. Thomas
P. Dillon, Note, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in Biotechnical
Research: Why A Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV
628 (1989); Jennifer Lavoie, Note, Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore
v. Regents of the University of California, 75 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1989).
For a broad discussion of the market in human "products," see. e.g., Andrew
Kimbrell, The Human Body Shop: Does America Want a 'Free Market' in Organs
and Tissues? The Washington Post, July 1, 1990, at B3.
97 Henry L. Hipkens, The Failed Search for the Perfect Analogy: More
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body parts. 9 8 Others were concerned about possible delay and
increased health care costs caused by patients' attempts to negotiate
higher selling prices for their cells or body parts.99
In a related vein, there were concerns, too, that access to tissues
needed for research and development could be impeded because of
patients' financial demands. Because research predates product sales,
finding the money to meet those demands could prove difficult.100
However, still another problem with permitting Moore to recover on
a conversion theory had considerable influence on the court.10 1
Conversion imposes strict liability on third parties, and statutes of
limitation1 02 do not begin to run until purchase. 103 This was a major
worry of the biotechnology industry leading it to urge that the Supreme
Court consider the potentially liability of its members for the use of even
the oldest available cell lines. 104 Industry representatives argued that a
company would risk a lawsuit every time a tissue sample or cell line
with hazy or unknown origins were used. Also, they predicted that
threats of suit would make researchers hesitait to continue using
samples of uncertain ownership. 105 Were this to come to pass, it might
Reflections on the Unusual Case of John Moore, 80 KY. LJ. 337, 343 (1992)
(questions the adequacy of existing law to address the novel problem presented in
Moore).
98 Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of
the University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 Ol-Io ST.
LJ. 499, 501 (1990) (argues that the court of appeals decision was a correct and
reasonable approach to the problem of a proprietary interest in cells); see also,
Kimbrell, supra note 95.
99 Dillon, supra note 95 (discusses reasons for not compensating tissue sources).
100 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the Industrial Biotechnology Association at
19.
101 See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d. at 484 n.38.
102 Statutes of limitations set forth the period of time within which a person must
bring a particular cause of action. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAwDIcIONARY 927 (6th ed.
1990).
103 Culp, 298 P.2d. at 164.
104 Brief supra note 100, at 19.
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lead to years of effort being lost and potentially lifesaving treatments
never becoming fully developed. In a related vein the industry also
expressed concern about the financial burden of having to implement a
nationwide title system for specimens and advise former patients of
newly discovered commercial interests. 106
Thus, the court analogized to a case in which the application of strict
liability to pharmaceuticals had been found to be detrimental to the
public welfare 1° 7 and decided that finding a property interest in excised
cells would be similarly unwise, stating that: "Indeed, this is a far more
compelling case for limiting the expansion of tort liability....",108
Finally, as mentioned earlier, the majority was reinforced in its view
by finding that any extension of the law of conversion was unnecessary
to address Moore's injury.1°9
Moore's Potential Remedies
Remedies Discussed by Members of the Court
One of the most interesting aspects of the Supreme Court's opinion
is the way it merges traditional notions of informed consent with the law
applicable to fiduciaries. Following their decision, Sanford Gage,
Moore's attorney, opined that: "If breach of fiduciary trust can be
proved, the potential share of damages will be greater than it would have
been for innocent conversion." 110
Whether this is true remains to be seen. The majority seemed to
believe that liability under theories of informed consent and breach of
fiduciary duty would vindicate Moore's interests. While Justice
Broussard concurred in finding that Moore would have such causes of
105 Id. at 18.
106 However, for an incisive criticism of the majority's analysis of conversion, see
Robert A. Bohrer, Old Blood in New Bottles, 9 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 251
(1990).
107 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
108 Moore, 793 P.2d. at 496.
109 Id. at 496-7.
110 Calif Biotech Suit Survives, But Theory Dies, Nat'l U., July 23, 1990, at 6.
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action, he nevertheless expressed doubts about what could be recovered
and offered up only the possibility of punitive damages for willful
misconduct. 111
For that reason, he disagreed 112 with strongly dissenting Judge
Mosk's view that threat of suit for nondisclosure is "illusory" 113 or
"largely a paper tiger." 114 To recover for lack of informed consent, the
law requires a causal relationship11 5 between a failure to inform and an
injury. 116 That is, plaintiffs must prove that, if they had been informed
of all pertinent information, they would have declined to consent.
Justice Mosk argues that this unfairly prohibits patients from sharing in
economic benefits derived from the exploitation of their tissues and does
not punish third parties who may be more at fault than the physician. 117
He emphasized that "the nondisclosure cause of action accentuates the
negative and eliminates the positive: the patient can say no, but he
cannot say yes and expect to share in the proceeds of his
contribution." 118
Further, Justice Mosk believed that, under the doctrine of informed
consent, it would be difficult to show damages to Moore corresponding
to benefits to the defendants. The splenectomy actually improved
111 Compensatory damages are those that make the plaintiff "whole." In contrast,
punitive or exemplary damages focus, not on the plaintiff's injury, but on the
egregiousness of the defendant's behavior. In some cases, punitive damages may far
exceed compensatory damages. See, e.g., BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (6th ed.
1990).
1 12 Moore, 793 P.2d at 500.
113 Id. at 519.
114 Id. at 520
115 Cause-in-fact is not enough; proximate cause is required. An injury is
proximately caused by acts, or failures to act, whenever the injury was either a direct
result of or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. See, e.g.,
BLAa's LAw DICnoNARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990).
116 Moore, 793 P.2d at 519.
1 17 Id. at 520-1.
118 Id. at 520.
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Moore's condition. Moreover, the inconvenience of travel, pain and
discomfort of the collection of samples and emotional distress from
being deceived might not amount to much in dollars. Therefore, he
concluded that the difficulty of patients in recovering damages would
not offer proper encouragement for physicians to adhere to proper
informed consent procedures. 119
Constructive Trusts Generally
Constructive trusts are designed to prevent unjust enrichment by
compelling the restoration of property by a wrongdoer. 12 0 The law
considers a person who acquires something wrongfully to be an
involuntary trustee for the benefit of the rightful owner. 12 1 The
conditions required to create a constructive trust are the existence of a
res,122 the plaintiff's right to it, and the defendant's gain of the res by
fraud, undue influence, violation of the trust, or other wrongful act. 123
Traditionally, a res has been thought to be a tangible object.
However, California courts have not imposed such strict interpretations
of the term as to preclude the application of the constructive trust remedy
in situations where it has been deemed appropriate. 124
Constructive trusts are creatures of equity. In dealing with
them, equity will disregard mere form, and will ascertain and
act on the substance of things, regarding that as done which
should have been done. The determination of whether a
particular transaction is unconscionable is not governed by
hard and fast rules, but is committed largely to the
enlightened conscience of the individual judge, subject to the
revisionary action of appellate tribunals.
1 19 Id. at 518-20.
120 Blair v. Mahon, 230 P.2d 832, 837 (1951).
121 CAL CIv. CODE §§ 2223-2224 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
122 A "res" is property or an interest in property. It is also considered a "thing", or
an "object." Categories include real and personal or fungible and not fungible; also,
persons may be so regarded for some purposes. See, e.g., BLAcK's LAW DIcIONARY
1304 (6th ed. 1990).
123 U.S. v. Pegg, 782 F.2d 1498 (9th Cir. 1986); CAL CIV. CODE § 2224 (West
1985 & Supp. 1992).
124 Elliott v. Elliott, 41 Cal. Rptr. 686, 689 (4th Dist. 1964).
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California courts have recognized the right of a beneficiary under a
constructive trust to obtain a money judgment in lieu of a destroyed res
and to recover the value of trust property commingled by a constructive
trustee with his own properties, so that the identity thereof could no
longer be traced.125 Constructive trusts extend to property acquired in
exchange for that wrongfully acquired and to profit or enhancement in
value of the property traced into the trust.126 Moreover, constructive
trustees are obligated to account for any profits, with interest.127 Yet,
bona fide purchasers for value are protected.128
Should the Constructive Trust Remedy be Available to Moore?
Dr. Golde does not believe that what he did was wrong. "'This
patient and this case are extraordinary and do not represent the attitudes
of all patients,' Golde said. 'I have a lot of patients, and they know all
about this case.' Their reaction is 'anytime you want anything, with no
strings attached,' they would supply it."129 Yet, this does not answer
Moore's allegations that for over seven years, Golde led Moore to
believe that the treatments he recommended were solely for Moore's
health and well being.130 Those visits were stressful for Moore. He
reported a belief that each visit would reveal that his cancer hadn't been
cured. 131 While such emotional distress might be compensated through
traditional application of informed consent, and perhaps even as a
battery in these circumstances, it is highly subjective, and a constructive
125 Id.
12 6 Haskel Engineering & Supply Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 144
Cal. Rptr. 189 (2d Dist. 1978).
12 7 CAL PROB. CODE § 16440 (a)(2) (West 1985).
12 8 Weingand v. Atlantic Savings & Loan Assoc., 464 P.2d 106 (1970).
A bona fide purchaser is one who acquires property from someone other than the
owner, for value, and without notice of the status of the title. See, e.g., BLACK'S
TAwDcDONARY 1304 (6th ed. 1990).
129 H. McIntosh, Court Test of Tissue Ownership Leaves Uncertainty About
Impact, 80 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1270 (1988).
1301a
131 Hearings, supra, note 5, at 242 (testimony of John Moore).
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trust approach would have more predictable consequences.
Although this may pose the largest difficulty, for this purpose,
Moore's interest in his cells should be adequate- to satisfy the need for a
res. Whether of not it might be regarded as "property" for all purposes,
there is no doubt that Golde and the Regents have property interests
derived from his cells. The fact that they have been able to license others
supports this conclusion.1 32 Also, as Justice Broussard pointed out in
dissent, if the cells had been stolen from a UCLA laboratory, there
would be no question but that they would have a cause of action for
conversion.133
Also, no one seems to question whether Moore had a right to decide
what would be done with his cells before they were removed. As the
majority states:134
There is... no need to read the statutes to permit
"scientific use" contrary to the patient's expressed wish. A
fully informed patient may always withhold consent to
treatment by a physician whose research plans the patient
does not approve.
Nor does the majority rule out the possibility that patients may retain a
rights in their excised cells. While the court rejected extending the
application of conversion to Moore's unique circumstance, their
decision "does not purport to hold that excised cells can never be
property for any purpose whatsoever." 135
Further, Justice Broussard's dissenting opinion interprets the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act as giving the patient, not the physician or
hospital who receives the body part, authority to designate, within the
parameters of the statute, the particular use to which the part may be
put.136 He went on to point out that, although the statute is based on
donations of organs after death, in many cases, family members donate
organs to save the life of another family member. If a hospital decided to
132 Moore, 793 P. 2d at 482.
133 Id. at 501.
134 Id. at 492 (footnote omitted).
135 Moore, 793 P.2d at 493.
136 Id. at 502.
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use the organ for another purpose, no one would deny that the hospital
had violated the legal right of the donor by its unauthorized use of the
donated organ. 137 The problem, of course, is the remedy.
While a constructive trust may be placed on Moore's cells, more
importantly, a constructive trust may be placed on Golde's (and the
Regents') 13 8 profits from the cells. Although Golde has argued that
only through his efforts did the cells become valuable, he has also
acknowledged that Moore's cells were unique and that without them, his
research would have been stalled. As explained in Golde's patent, the
"Mo cell line' 139 offered the messenger RNAs for these polypeptides in
relatively large amounts compared to the total amount of messenger
RNA (mRNA) present. 14 0 As was also stated in the patent, because of
the cumbersome nature and difficulties associated with other genetic
engineering, polypeptide synthesis methods, mRNA methods are the
most desirable methods for producing peptides: 14 1
In each cell, there is continuously produced a large number
of different messenger RNA molecules. Therefore, means
must be provided for isolating the messenger RNA of
interest from the other messenger RNA molecules. Where a
messenger RNA of interest is normally produced in only
small amounts, it is frequently desirable, if not necessary,
to obtain cells which enhance the amount of messenger RNA
of interest present in the cell. (Emphasis added.)
Although every human being theoretically has the genetic ability to
produce lymphokine proteins, this language indicates the importance of
a source of cells, i.e., a patient who produces lymphokine proteins and
the lymphokine mRNAs in abundance.
1371,1
138 The Regents may still be liable under the theory of repondeat superior
mentioned, but not discussed, in the California Supreme Court's opinion. Moore,
793 P. 2d at 486.
139 The cell line derived from Moore's spleen cells.
140 Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 519. The patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,438,032, is
reproduced in the Court's Appendix A, beginning id. at 518.
141,Id. at 518.
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Hairy-cell leukemia is a rare condition that affects only an estimated
250 Americans each year.14 2 Although other cell lines from patients
suffering from hairy-cell lukemia had been established, Dr. Golde could
not explain why only the Mo cell line overproduced lymphokines until
after 1982, when the human T-lymphotrophic virus II (HTLV-I1) was
identified. 14 3 Moore's cells overproduced lymphokines because they
were infected with HTLV-lI. Whether or not he understood at the time
why Moore's cells overproduced lymphokines, Golde nevertheless
recognized the advantage of access to Moore's cells. The cells were
valuable in their raw state; otherwise why would he have gone to
extraordinary lengths to guarantee exclusive access? 144
As discussed earlier, the majority's primary concern about
permitting Moore to recovery for conversion appears to have been the
potential impact on third parties. They seemed to be intent on avoiding
the risk of appearing to require everyone who ever came into possession
of human cells to verify their "consensual pedigree 14 5 and concerned
that the threat of suit would stunt important research. 146
A constructive trust would not present the same concerns.
"Everyone to whom property is transferred in violation of trust, holds
the same as an involuntary trustee under such trust, unless he purchased
it in good faith, and for a valuable consideration." 14 7 Thus, bona fide
142 G.B. White & K.W. O'Connor, Rights, Duties, and Commercial Interests:
John Moore Versus the Regents of the University of California, 8 CANCER
INVESIATON 65 (1990).
143 ida .
144 See supra at notes 16 & 19. Golde discouraged Moore from seeking treatment
locally in Seattle and arranged for Moore to come to UCLA for all treatments, thus
hiding Moore's unique condition from other researchers who may have been interested
in studying Moore's unique cells.
Also, the patent states: "At no time has the Mo cell line been available to other
than the investigators involved with its initial discovery...." Moore, 249 Cal. Rptr.
at 518.
145 Moore, 793 P.2d at 487, n.16. All users of human cells would have a duty to
verify that the samples they use were obtained by proper informed consent.
146 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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purchasers, i.e., pharmaceutical companies and others who purchased
rights in the cell line without knowledge of any improper behavior,
would be insulated from liability.
Conclusion
Requirements of full disclosure attempt to level the playing field.
Informed consent, alone, appears inadequate to deal with physicians
who would abuse their position of trust for financial gain.
Ideal legal remedies hold individuals responsible for their wrongful
behavior but have limited effects on others. Imposing a constructive
trust for breach of fiduciary duty seems ideal in the hopefully rare
circumstances of Moore.
Unlike conversion, breach of fiduciary duty and constructive trust
require less analysis. The focus is on the behavior of a fiduciary, not the
value of the property. Unlike informed consent, recovery is unlikely
either to be hindered by a need to show that a procedure would have
been refused or to be rendered uncertain by the need to assess damages.
While Moore is entitled to the latter, he is also entitled to any benefits
acquired by Golde and his employer through any abuse of trust that
Moore can prove at trial.
14 7 Blair, 230 P.2d at 836.
